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Millennia come and millennia go, and the fact of war remains unchanged.
People still fight for territory, the land of their fathers, Lebensraum, control
of the seas, gold, silver and diamonds, oil, water, pillage and the spoils of war,
resources of all kinds, the glorification of leaders, gods of many faiths,
politics, ideology, conquest, the establishment, peace and stability of empires,
the right to be left alone, and sometimes, so we are told, justice, resistance to
aggression, and the preservation of peace. Measured in millennial time, very
little about war has changed, and, further, nothing distinguished the passage
from 1999 to 2000.
Decades come and decades go, on the other hand, and while certain
features of war remain unchanged, others do indeed seem altered. Measured
on the scale of years and decades, the means and methods of warfare, reasons
for making war, and the calculation of what is to be gained and not gained by
fighting, have shifted. Perhaps these shifts are permanent, perhaps they are
not, but conflict in the world is not what it was prior to, for example, the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the Gulf War. Technology has changed and empires
have shifted or disappeared. Weaponry and geopolitics are not quite as they
were a few decades ago. The attitudes of the populations of the empire of the
West, the industrialized democracies toward war and fighting are not the
same as they were a few decades ago; both the reasons that democratic
majorities accept for fighting and their tolerance for casualties among their
own have shifted. The extrusion of the media directly onto the battlefield has
changed the perception of conflict. A strong sense shapes the perception of
emergent global elites, the newly formed global bourgeoisie, that because the
world is an ever-smaller place, indeed, in their view, one which is
interconnected and interdependent, war should be managed, controlled and
finally done away with in the way that police manage crime in a domestic
society. The emergent global elites believe that world society today is no
longer an agglomeration of loosely linked local societies, but instead
something approaching a global domestic society.
Likewise, on the scale of years and decades, the American understanding
and perception of war, the means and use of military force, have also
shifted-although at this point in time it is largely a mass of questions rather
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than answers. What should be the role of the U.S. military in the world? The
superpower maintaining the grand peace? The gendarmerie of the empire
that polices smaller societies? A force for liberal internationalism's sense of
justice? Should the U.S. military see itself as an instrument of international
politics operating outside the bounds of law, or should it see the world as a
domestic society in which it acts as a policeman, within the constraints and to
the ends of law? To what extent should it be deployed for the material
interests of the United States and to what extent should it be deployed in
furtherance of American values? What should be the composition of the U.S.
military forces; should it continue to be an all-volunteer force, and is that a
good thing for a democratic society? What should the roles of women and
homosexuals be within the military? What obligations do civilian political
leaders owe to those American soldiers who fight? Should civilian political
leaders treat the purpose of U.S. soldiers as serving the interests of the
United States or as a kind of resource of the international community? When
atrocities and war crimes are committed, how are those actions to be judged
and who shall do the judging?
The articles, essays, and review essays that follow in this special section
attempt to undertake some of these vexing, urgent questions about war and
the United States military. They do so from a wide variety of viewpoints,
methodological as well as political. They are not narrowly focused on law;
they concern instead the role of the military within a society founded on the
rule of law and the use of the military in a wider world for which the rule of
law is a serious issue. As editor of this section, I sought authors who I
thought could break out of the usual box in writing about these topics, and I
have been pleased with the results.
The writings in this section can be divided broadly into two categories.
First, there are articles dealing with the whole world-how the U.S.,
including by implication the U.S. military, ought to think about international
law, the use of force internationally, and the respective roles of interests and
ideals in establishing the conditions of the use of force abroad. The lead
article in this category is John Bolton's sharp attack on the idea, so
prevalent among international lawyers and scholars, that international law
really is "law" in the usual domestic sense. My sense of international law
academicians is that they believe that they have said all that has needed to
have been said in order to establish the "law"-like nature of international
law a long time ago-thereby, not coincidentally, establishing the validity of
their profession as specifically international lawyers. Unfortunately, the
conclusions were reached almost entirely in a conversation among academics
who were already inclined to agree with each other as to what the outcomes
of the conversation should be. Bolton argues that the serious problems of
applying a misguided and misleading metaphor from domestic law
transplanted to the international world do not go away just because
international lawyers have agreed among themselves that they should.

Also in this category is Charles Nihan's review essay of two books on
the use of U.S. military force abroad: Immaculate Invasion, on the U.S.
invasion of Haiti, and Black Hawk Down, on the U.S. Army Ranger debacle in
Somalia that so much shaped perception within the U.S. military about the
ability and utility of the U.S. military to "micro"-intervene in a law
enforcement capacity among a hostile civilian population. In a different way,
Gary Solis' solidly empirical research comparing the harsh sentences for
atrocities handed out by military court martials to U.S. soldiers in Vietnam to
the sentences to which they were later reduced by civilian courts of appeal,
goes to the question of whether a military, such as the U.S. military, is
capable of policing its own behavior in the world; it obviously has significance
for whether the U.S. ought to participate in the nascent International
Criminal Court. Finally, John Ryle's discussion about the nature of
"complex humanitarian emergencies," a somewhat euphemistic reference to
conflicts-including the slaughters in Rwanda and Burundi, the endemic
fighting in the southern Sudan, and so on-reminds us of the kinds of
"surface" conditions that the U.S. military, in what some would regard as a
glorious and others as a dubious effort to go forth and do good in the world,
might face in such places.
The second category of writings goes to the question of the U.S. military
in relation to U.S. domestic society and, significantly, how (indeed, "whether")
it remains prepared as a military to "fight," while still maintaining the
character that U.S. democratic domestic society requires of it. Obviously the
nature of that "character" is a hotly contested issue of the culture wars, a
topic which these articles address head on. Michael Spak takes on the
question of sexual orientation and the military, offering a legal and social
dissection of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy that still governs the military
regarding homosexual matters. Julie Laskaris, a professor of classics,
analyzes the nature of Athenian and Spartan homoerotic relationships
through the lens of the "eros" of Achilles, with an eye on the larger question
of homoerotic bonding among soldiers generally, including in contemporary
armies, as part of the much-vaunted process of "small unit bonding" that is so
frequently understood to be the basis of morale within the U.S. military.
Moving from the question of gays in the military to questions of gender and
the U.S. military, John Corr disputes the idea that the U.S. military has,
what some have argued, an inherent culture and mentality of rape. Finally,
Mark Hager offers an assessment of the role and limits of liberalism within
the U.S. military in a review essay of Stephanie Gutman's widely noticed
book on women in the military and military preparedness entitled The
Kinder, Gentler Military.
The broader question that all these articles dealing with the U.S. military
and domestic American society address is the requirement of military
preparedness, and on the other hand, the extant desire among liberals
especially to use the U.S. military as a place in which authoritarian social
experiments can be carried out in matters of race, sex, and sexual orientation
that could not be constitutionally carried out in broader American society.

The tendency is especially noticeable among U.S. liberals, but it is not limited
to them by any mean. For example, the prohibition on the sale of Playboy and
Penthouse at military PXs was the work not of American feminists, but the
American religious right wing, apparently eager for moral purity among
America's fighting men and women. What often goes unnoted, however, is
that changes in the composition of U.S. military forces that reflect various
perceptions about who should fight and in what roles have the potential to
alter not only military preparedness, but to change the definition of the kind
of war the U.S. military is prepared to fight and the kind of enemy it is
willing to take on. If a critic of women in the military, such as Stephanie
Gutmann, is right-and Hager's review essay suggests that she is only partly
so at best-then one concern might be that it leads to a military which
naturally gravitates to push-button and aerial warfare rather than infantry
war on the ground, both because, Gutmann argues, the public is not prepared
to contemplate women actually in combat in that way and, she argues.
women in the military are not really prepared to fight in that way either.
Assuming that Gutmann is right, a military that for reasons of political
correctness is unwilling to acknowledge this fact, however, is a military that
will either have trouble sustaining a serious infantry war or will avoid it by
gravitating to other forms of warfare which might or might not be successful
as methods of winning wars. The answers that society gives to questions
arising out of the culture wars have effects, potentially, even on the
technology of warfare that the military seeks as it accommodates to the
nature of its personnel, and that, in turn, might have an effect on the kind of
fight which the military is prepared to undertake. Whether that war is the
one which the United States might be obliged to undertake is, however,
another question entirely, and one which will be answered by the politics,
economics, and forces of the world outside the United States, not by the
diktats of political correctness from within; perhaps the war we are culturally
prepared to undertake will be the one we are actually forced to undertakebut perhaps not.
Moreover, the culture wars over the use and function of the military are
not limited to U.S. domestic society. The contested question of the role of the
U.S. military, as well as the rest of the NATO forces, is whether they exist to
fight wars or to undertake other often radically different missions-warfighting versus armed international social work, in a phrase. Most of the
NATO armies have long since settled that question; starting with Canada,
they exist as peacekeeping forces, not war-making ones, and even Britain and
France are well on their way to world gendarmerie status. This produces a
sharp conceptual divide over the perception of the use of force between those
states for which war is essentially an altruistic act of peacekeeping. For
example, it is simply inconceivable that Britain, France, Canada, Norway, or
the Netherlands would have to fight a war in which its national survival or
its national territory or even a vital national interest were at stake-and
those states for whom fighting and winning a war is both entirely
conceivable, as is, perhaps more importantly to the conception of one's

military, the possibility of losing. These latter include Russia, China, Taiwan,
the Koreas, India, Pakistan, Israel, the Arab Middle East, and, of course, the
United States. The difference, of course, is that the United States as a warmaking, as distinguished from peacekeeping, state acts not only for its own
interests, but in order that the rest of the Western empire of industrialized
democracies can go about their modest gendarmerie duties, cheerfully
continuing to reduce their commitments to NATO as a war-making
institution so as to leave the U.S. holding the security bag, cheerfully
continuing to reduce their defense budget burdens in favor of propping up
their welfare states, and then, however, lecturing the U.S. on its various
supposed moral failings in declining to sign on to treaties aimed principally at
constraining their benefactor's ability to make war.
In effect, these aspects of the international culture wars reflect a deeper
concern as to the nature of the international world. War-making versus
peacekeeping, winning wars or engaging in armed international social
work-the question is ultimately one of whether the world is conceived as a
place of competing states and competing state interests as well as competing
ideals, or instead a world that is gradually coming together over the
fundamental nature of those ideals, so that those who depart from those
norms are no longer one's competitors or perhaps even one's enemies, but
instead deviants from the international norm. Realists of a certain kindrepresented here by Bolton-believe that the latter is dangerously utopian; it
is unfair, however, to characterize such realists as simply devoid of ideals; on
the contrary, they typically do believe that ideals and interests must engage
together, but that unchastened, strident idealism is, paradoxically, much
more likely to unleash the dogs of bitter conflict than a constrained realism.
Idealists of a certain one-world kind, including most of the international
lawyers' community, support the former concept and hope to see an evolution
toward one world, in which the use of force is the exercise of a police function
over miscreants. If the position of the realists is an ancient one, reaching back
to the Melian generals of ancient Greece, the idealist one is equally ancient
and, indeed, millenarian. It is, after all, precisely what the writer of the book
of Isaiah of the Hebrew bible looked forward to see, a world in which people
"shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks:
nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any
more."' What goes often unnoticed in that remarkable passage is the
condition which the prophet lays down as the condition for this happy state of
affairs:
And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain
of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the
mountains and shall be exalted above the hills; and all
nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say,
Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the
house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways,
I Isaiah 2:4 (King James Version).

and we will walk in his paths: for out of Zion shall go forth the
law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall
2
judge among the nations and rebuke many people.
The condition for world peace for the prophet Isaiah-whose words are
inscribed at the United Nations headquarters in New York-is the
millenarian one of a unified world, with one law giver and one law. For the
idealist, it is a dream achievable in ordinary time, and is the natural
progression of human civilization, albeit with many lapses backwards. For
the realist, it is a dream more likely achievable no earlier than when the Lord
is come.

